LAWRENCE V LAWRENCE: THE USE OF
RULE 60(b) MOTIONS BASED UPON
POSTJUDGMENT CHANGES IN
CONTROLLING LAW*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Although most courts hold that a postjudgment change in controlling law fails to justify relief from final judgment under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), 1 the Alaska Supreme Court recently
reaffirmed that a change in controlling law may warrant relief under
Alaska Civil Rule 60(b)(1). 2 In Lawrence v. Lawrence,3 the Alaska
Copyright © 1987 by Alaska Law Review
* The author of this note clerked for Chief Justice Rabinowitz when Lawrence
was before the Alaska Supreme Court. The author, however, did no substantive work
on the opinion, and the ideas reflected in the note are his own.
1. E.g., Lubben v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Board No. 27, 453 F.2d 645, 650
(lst Cir. 1972); Title v. United States, 263 F.2d 28, 31 (9th Cir. 1959); Collins v. City
of Witchita, 254 F.2d 837, 839 (10th Cir. 1958); see also 7 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 60.22[3], at 60-185 to 60-194 (2d ed. 1985).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) provides in part:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a
party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding
for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is
no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application;
or
(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1),
(2) and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding
was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) does not affect
the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
The Alaska rule concerning relief from final judgment is identical to the Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). See Alaska R. Civ. P. 60(b). This note will use "Rule
60(b)" to refer to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) will be referred to as "Civil Rule 60(b)."
2. Lawrence v. Lawrence, 718 P.2d 142, 145-46 (Alaska 1986); see also Pearson
v. Bachner, 503 P.2d 1401, 1402 (Alaska 1972) (a party seeking relief from judgment
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Supreme Court held that a party seeking to halt the operation of a

final judgment on the basis of a subsequent change in law may utilize a
Civil Rule 60(b)(1) motion. The supreme court, however, affirmed the
superior court's refusal to grant relief under Civil Rule 60(b)(1) because the motion was filed four months after the supreme court overruled the precedent for the original judgment. 4 By a narrow
interpretation of the language of the rule, the supreme court held that

the party seeking relief must fie the Civil Rule 60(b)(1) motion within

the thirty-day period allowed for an appeal.5 Evidently, if the party
complies with this time requirement the superior court may entertain
the motion and consider the subsequent
change in law as a factor upon
6
which to base the grant of relief.

This note does not disagree with the result in Lawrence. Nevertheless, this note argues against the strict application of the rule

adopted in Lawrence that Civil Rule 60(b)(1) motions based on
postjudgment changes in controlling law be fied during the appeal period. Civil Rule 60(b) makes no mention of the period for appeal.
Instead, the rule establishes an outside limit of one year and prescribes

a "reasonable time" standard. While a motion filed four months after
on the basis of a subsequent change in the law should make a motion under Civil Rule
60(b)).
3. 718 P.2d 142 (Alaska 1986).
4. Id. at 146. The Alaska Supreme Court, however, did state that relief from the
prospective aspects of the judgment could be granted under Civil Rule 60(b)(5). See
infra note 42 and accompanying text. Generally, decisions on motions under Civil
Rule 60(b) are left to the trial court's discretion. Aguchak v. Montgomery Ward Co.,
520 P.2d 1352, 1354 (Alaska 1974). Accordingly, a reviewing court will reverse such
decision only if it is left with a definite and firm conviction from the whole record that
the trial judge erred. Guard v. P & R Enter., 631 P.2d 1068, 1071 (Alaska 1981);
Gregor v. Hodges, 612 P.2d 1008, 1010 (Alaska 1980). However, an appellate court
owes no deference to a trial court's decision on a motion under Civil Rule 60(b)(4)
because the validity of a judgment is strictly a question of law.
5. Lawrence, 718 P.2d at 145-46. Alaska Rule Appellate Procedure 204(a) provides that an appeal must be filed no later than 30 days after entry of final judgment.
Similarly, most courts that have considered motions made under Rule 60(b)(l) have
required that such motions be made within 30 days of final judgment. See, e.g., Parks
v. U.S. Life & Credit Corp., 677 F.2d 838 (1lth Cir. 1982); Oliver v. Monsanto Co., 56
F.R.D. 370, 372 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Oliver v. Home Indem. Co., 487
F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1983); cf International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 556 F.2d 665, 670
(2d Cir. 1977) (relief from substantive judicial mistake under Rule 60(b)(1) may not be
made after the time for appeal has elapsed), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978); Schildhaus v. Moe, 335 F.2d 529, 531 (2d Cir. 1964); Tarkington v. United States Lines Co.,
222 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1958). But see Lairsey v. Advance Abrasives Co., 542 F.2d 928,
930 (5th Cir. 1976) (Rule 60(b) does not inflexibly require that a motion raising a
postjudgment change in decisional law be filed before the time allowable for appeal
has run.); accord, 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 2858, at 178-79 (1973).
6. Cf Pearson v. Bachner, 503 P.2d 1401, 1402 (Alaska 1972).
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the law has changed may be unreasonable, this note argues that a Civil

Rule 60(b)(1) motion filed within thirty days of a postjudgment
change in law, and no later than one year after the entry of judgment,
is reasonable. 7 Part II of this note sets forth the policy considerations
underlying state and federal decisions not to entertain Rule 60(b)(1)
motions filed after the expiration of the time for appeal. Part III discusses and criticizes the manner in which the Alaska Supreme Court
has applied Civil Rule 60(b)(1). Part IV examines the applicability of
Civil Rule 60(b)(5) or (6) to cases involving postjudgment changes in
the law, and concludes that these clauses should not be relied upon.
Finally, Part V proposes that Alaska courts extend relief under Civil
Rule 60(b)(1) from postjudgment changes in the law to parties who fie
motions within thirty days of the announcement of the change and not

more than one year after entry of final judgment.
II.

APPLICATION

OF RULE 60(b)(1): Artificial Boundaries

Most courts are willing to apply Rule 60(b)(1) to "mistakes" involving inadvertent judicial errors." Some courts have held that judicial error represents the only type of error that such a motion can
correct. 9 Others have also considered as "mistake" a "fundamental
misconception of the law," 10 which encompasses the failure to follow
controlling decisional law.l" The Alaska Supreme Court, 12 along with
a small minority of federal courts,1 3 has extended the definition of
7. For a discussion of what constitutes reasonable time, see infra notes 27-35 and
accompanying text.
8. E.g., Barrier v. Beaver, 712 F.2d 231, 234 (6th Cir. 1983); Liberty Mut. Ins. v.
EEOC, 691 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1982); Fox v. Brewer, 620 F.2d 177, 180 (8th Cir.
1980); Meadows v. Cohen, 409 F.2d 750, 752 (5th Cir. 1969); Gila River Ranch, Inc.
v. United States, 368 F.2d 354, 357 (9th Cir. 1966); Tarkington, 222 F.2d 358, 360; see
also 7 J. MOORE, supra note 1, 60.22[3], at 60-186 ("[W]hen the mistake may fairly
be characterized as the product of inadvertance, it is correctable within a reasonable
time."). But see Elias v. Ford Motor Co., 734 F.2d 463, 467 (lst Cir. 1984); Silk v.
Sandoval, 435 F.2d 1266, 1267-68 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1012 (1971); Note,
FederalRule 60(b): Finality of Civil Judgments v. Self-Correction by DistrictCourt of
JudicialErrorof Law, 43 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 98 (1967).
9. E.g., Fox, 620 F.2d at 180.
10. See, ag., Ashford v. Steuart, 657 F.2d 1053, 1055 (9th Cir. 1981); Lairsey v.
Advance Abrasives Co., 542 F.2d 928, 930 (5th Cir. 1976); Meadows v. Cohen, 409
F.2d 750, 752 (5th Cir. 1969).
11. Lairsey, 542 F.2d at 929; see also Note, Relieffrom Final Judgment Under
Rule 60(b)(1) Due to JudicialErrorsof Law, 83 MicH. L. REV. 1571 (1985) (arguing
that the trial judge should be allowed to correct all obvious errors of law).
12. See Lawrence v. Lawrence, 718 P.2d 142 (Alaska 1986); Pearson v. Bachner,
503 P.2d 1401 (Alaska 1972).
13. Parks v. U.S. Life & Credit Corp., 677 F.2d 838 (1 1th Cir. 1982); Lairsey, 542
F.2d 928; Pierce v. Cook & Co., 518 F.2d 720 (10th Cir. 1975) (applying Rule 60(b)(6)
where results differed in state and federal court actions based on same accident), cert.
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"mistake" to include cases in which a change in the controlling law
closely follows the lower court decision.14 This expansion in the coverage of the concept of "mistake" is reasonable because a trial court
decision entered shortly before an appellate court changes the controlling law is thereby rendered mistaken. When an appellate court
changes controlling law it acknowledges that the law has been incorrectly interpreted in the past. Moreover, the immediacy of the change
in law relative to the challenged judgment creates a sense that at the
time of the trial court decision the appellate court knew that the precedent relied upon by the trial court was erroneous.' 5
The most frequently stated rationale for allowing trial courts to
correct their "mistakes" is that judicial efficiency is improved without
creating a means to escape the effects of a failure to file a timely appeal.16 As Professor Moore asks:
denied, 423 U.S. 1079 (1976); Tarkington v. United States Lines Co., 222 F.2d 318 (2d
Cir. 1955) (by implication); Oliver v. Monsanto Co., 56 F.R.D. 370 (S.D. Tex. 1972),

aff'd sub nom. Oliver v. Home Indem. Co., 487 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
14. It is not entirely clear that the Alaska Supreme Court intended to give Civil
Rule 60(b)(1) this broad reach. The rule announced in Lawrence and Pearson is perhaps "broader than the facts of the case[s] warrant." See 11 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, supra note 5, § 2858, at 176. In both Lawrence and Pearson, the supreme
court affirmed the superior courts' dismissals of motions made under Civil Rule 60(b)
on the ground that the movants did not file the motions within a "reasonable time,"
which was defined as the period within which an appeal could be brought. Since all
six clauses of Civil Rule 60(b) permit the trial court to deny a 60(b) motion if it is not
filed within a reasonable time, the court need not have specified which provision of
Civil Rule 60(b), if any, it considered applicable to postjudgment changes in law.
Additionally, analysis reveals that the "well reasoned authority" relied upon by
Pearson and, by implication, Lawrence is, in fact, not conclusive on the issue. The
courts in neither Tarkington v. United States Lines Co., 222 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1955),
nor Schildhaus v. Moe, 335 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1964), expressly state that Rule 60(b)(1)
is the specific clause that should control motions based upon postjudgment changes in
the law.
The Alaska Supreme Court, nonetheless, has expressly stated that Civil Rule
60(b)(1) should govern motions for relief from judgment that are based on postjudgment changes in the law. This holding appears to be the correct one, not because any
clear precedent mandates this result, but because common sense supports the notion
that decisions made shortly before the controlling law changes are effectively ones
which are mistaken.
15. The argument is even more compelling in the context of the Alaska court
system. In the federal system, district court decisions are subject to review both by
courts of appeals and by the United States Supreme Court. When two appellate
courts disagree, which is "mistaken"? In Alaska, the supreme court is the court for
appeals of superior court decisions from which there is no right of appeal to the court
of appeals. ALASKA STAT. § 22.05.10(b) (1985). A decision rendered by the supreme
court constitutes the final disposition for the state system and quickly removes doubt
as to who is "mistaken" unless the court chooses to overrule itself - an event unlikely
to occur within any given twelve-month period.
16. E.g., Oliver v. Home Indem. Co., 470 F.2d 329, 330-31 (5th Cir. 1972). In
Oliver, the court stated:
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Why should not the trial court have the power to correct its own
judicial error under 60(b)(1) within a reasonable time - which...
should not exceed the time of appeal - and thus avoid the inconvenience and expense of an appeal
17 by the party which the court is
now convinced should prevail?
Where an appeal or a Rule 60(b)(1) motion could remedy an alleged
error, correction by the trial court saves the parties the onus of financing costly appeals and removes from the appellate courts the burden of
entertaining them.
In order to prevent Rule 60(b)(1) motions from substituting for
appeals, nearly all courts restrict the time for filing such a motion to
the time period allowed for an appeal. 18 According to this reasoning,
Rule 60(b)(1) was not intended to serve as a substitute for a direct
appeal from an erroneous judgment. A reasonable time for making a
motion on the basis of judicial error should, therefore, not exceed the
time allowed for an appeal.
Courts uniformly adhere to the principle that litigants must file
Rule 60(b)(1) motions within the period for appeal in cases concerning
obvious errors of law, such as omitting interest on an award, 19 as well
as in those based upon changes in law announced after the expiration
of the period for appeal. 20 When a case involves a postjudgment
The policy framing such a construction is, of course, one aimed at preventing the unnecessary wasting of energies of both appellate courts and litigants. It seems that absent the chance of serious injury to the rights of any
party, the possible saving ofjudicial energies warrants the use of such discretionary reconsideration by the district court.
Id.; see also Schildhaus v. Moe, 335 F.2d 526, 531 (2d Cir. 1964) ("[T]here is indeed
good sense in permitting the trial court to correct its own error ... ."); Oliver v.
Monsanto, 56 F.R.D. 370, 372 (S.D. Tex. 1972) ("The purpose behind allowing the
trial court to correct its own errors is to prevent expensive appeals."), aff'd sub nom.
Oliver v. Home Indem. Co., 487 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1973).
17. 7 J. MOORE, supra note 1, 60.22[3], at 60-185 to 60-186.
18. See Lawrence v. Lawrence, 718 P.2d 142, 145-46 (Alaska 1986); Pearson v.
Bachner, 503 P.2d 1401, 1402 (Alaska 1972); Alaska Truck Transp., Inc. v. Berman
Packing Co., 469 P.2d 697, 700 (Alaska 1970); see also Barrier v. Beaver, 712 F.2d
231, 234 (6th Cir. 1983); Fox v. Brewer, 620 F.2d 177, 179 (8th Cir. 1980); CRI, Inc.
v. Watson, 608 F.2d 1137, 1143 (8th Cir. 1979); Compton v. Alton S.S. Co., 608 F.2d
96, 104 (4th Cir. 1979); International Control Corp. v. Vesco, 556 F.2d 665, 670 (2d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978); Gila River Ranch v. United States, 368
F.2d 354, 357 (9th Cir. 1966); cf Schildhaus v. Moe, 335 F.2d 529, 531 (2d Cir. 1964);
11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 5, § 2858, at 178. But see Lairsey, 542 F.2d
928. The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits would consider motions made after the period
for appeal has expired if timely notice of appeal has been filed. See infra note 32.
19. CR, Inc., 608 F.2d at 1143; Hoffman v. Celebrezze, 405 F.2d 833, 837 (8th
Cir. 1969). A leading commentary notes, however, that a truly minor oversight,
something of the type that is hardly more than a clerical error, may be corrected at
any time during the one-year limit contained in Rule 60(b). 11 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, supra note 5, § 2858, at 180.
20. See, e.g., Lawrence, 718 P.2d 142.
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change in law that resulted from the appeal of a related case, and the
petitioner failed to appeal, courts review Rule 60(b)(1) motions with

heightened scrutiny. Absent "extraordinary circumstances" prevent-

ing appeal, 2 1 an unsuccessful litigant is prohibited from relying on ap"shar[ing] in the fruits of victory" by using a Rule
peals by others and
22
60(b)(1) motion.
Concern over preventing the substitution of Rule 60(b)(1) mo-

tions for appeals does not, however, justify a requirement that the motion be filed during the time period allowed for an appeal when the
controlling law changed after the expiration of that period. 23 A deci-

sion based upon unambiguous controlling law is effectively not appealable.24 A party is unlikely to take on the expense of mounting an
appeal, nor is his attorney likely to advise him to do so, if the law
controlling the decision is clear and not in question. 25 Such an appeal
would be futile and a waste of resources for both the judiciary and the
parties concerned. The unsuccessful litigant has yet to find a reason to
appeal. Under these circumstances, restriction of the filing of a mo-

tion for relief to the time period allowed for appeal is not reasonable.
21. See Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193 (1950); Klapprott v. United
States, 335 U.S. 601, modified, 336 U.S. 942 (1949).
22. Parks v. U.S. Life & Credit Corp., 677 F.2d 838, 840 (11th Cir. 1982).
23. Finality of judgments constitutes another purpose underlying the time constraint. According to the Lawrence court, "[tihe purpose of limiting 60(b)(1) motions
to the 30 days allowed for appeals is the 'strong interest in the finality of litigation.'"
Lawrence, 718 P.2d at 146 (quoting Parks, 677 F.2d at 841). The courts agree that, at
some point, all litigation must become final. See, e.g., Ackermann v. United States,
340 U.S. 193, 198 (1950); Pierce v. Cook & Co., 518 F.2d 720, 722 (10th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1079 (1976). The doctrine of finality promotes social stability by
enhancing faith in, and encouraging reliance upon, the judicial system. See, e.g.,
Southern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 49 (1897) ("[T]he aid of judicial
tribunals would not be invoked for the vindication of rights ... if ... conclusiveness
did not attend the judgments of such tribunals."). The doctrine also assures that identical legal standards will be applied in similar fact situations and enhances efficient
judicial administration by reducing the need of the court to rely upon its own discretion. For a discussion of the goals of finality, see Note, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b): Standardsfor Relieffrom Judgments Due to Changes in Law, 43 U. CHI.
L. R.v. 646, 648-50 (1976). If judgments could be reopened due to changes of law,
even within one year, the resulting degradation of both the doctrine of finality and the
appellate process would produce "instability" bordering upon "chaos." Parks, 677
F.2d at 841.
24. And if the period for filing an appeal has expired, the decision is, of course,
not appealable.
25. Conversely, the likelihood of a party risking an appeal, and hopefully winning
a successful judgment, increases as the degree to which the controlling law is considered ambiguous increases.
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after the change in
The movant should be allowed a reasonable time
26
motion.
his
file
to
which
within
law
controlling
By its decision in Lairsey v. Advance Abrasives Co.,27 the Fifth
Circuit remains the only jurisdiction to acknowledge that it is unnecessary and undesirable to limit the time for filing a Rule 60(b)(1) motion
to the time allowable for appeal. 28 The court in Lairsey noted that
Rule 60(b) prescribes a reasonable time standard and makes no mention of the period for noticing an appeal, 29 which led the court to
conclude:
Limiting the time for filing a 60(b) motion to the period allowed for noticing [an] appeal is an artificial choice based upon convenience .... An inflexible "time allowable for appeal" limitation
would permit relief from minor errors of various kinds over longer
periods of time than relief from fundamental matters, an incongruous result out of keeping with the equitable purpose of Rule 60.
Also it would drain substantial vitality out of the concept that relief
from post-judgment change in decisional law is an appropriate subject in 60(b) relief, because the only post-judgment changes giving
within a very short time
rise to relief would
30 be those taking place
after judgment.
The Lairsey court also noted that a motion made after controlling
law changes is not a substitute for appeal:
There was no basis for appeal so long as [the controlling decisions]
stood. Of course, there is an important interest in finality of litigation. But Rule 60 itself addresses the issue by placing an outside
limit of one year on motions. Presumably it was the rule makers'
belief that beyond that point the system's need for finality would
prevail while within that period, through the "reasonable time" criterion, the interest of finality would be considered in conjunction
aware of possible
with the practical abilities
3 1 of litigants to become
grounds for 60(b) relief.
Lairsey has not been followed by other circuits. 3 2 The Fifth Circuit itself has circumscribed the reach of Lairsey when the Rule 60(b)
26. One commentator proposes that if an appeal is filed, a 60(b)(1) motion ought
to be allowed until the appellate court actually begins review of the case. See Note,
supra note 11, at 1579-83. Adoption of this proposal would encourage the filing of
appeals merely to preserve the unsuccessful litigant's right to file a Civil Rule 60(b)(1)
motion for relief if the law were to change in the future.
27. 542 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1976).
28. See also Chavez v. Balesh, 704 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1983) (affirming the district
court's grant of a Rule 60(b)(1) motion made after expiration of the time period for
noticing an appeal). Note that a notice of appeal was timely filed in Lairsey; however,
no appeal was filed in Chavez.
29. Lairsey, 542 F.2d at 930.
30. Id. at 930-31.
31. Id. at 931.
32. The Second and Ninth Circuits have held that a Rule 60(b)(1) motion cannot
be used to correct a mistake of a substantive legal nature after the time for appeal has
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motion is fied during the pendency of an appeal. 33 Nevertheless, the
reasoning of Lairsey rings true. Instead of adopting a rigid time re-

quirement applicable to all Rule 60(b)(1) motions, courts must recognize that what constitutes reasonable time depends upon the facts of

each case. 34 What may be a reasonable time restriction for the filing of
motions based on appealable judicial error may not be reasonable for

motions based upon changes in law occurring after the expiration of
the period for appeal. Professors Wright and Miller, finding case-by-

case adjudication appropriate, have identified a useful two-prong test
for reasonableness: "The courts consider whether the party opposing
the motion has been prejudiced by the delay in seeking relief and they
consider whether the moving party had some good reason for his fail'35
ure to take appropriate action sooner."
III. LA WRENCE v. LA WRENCE: THE APPLICATION
OF CIVIL RULE 60(b)(1)
Lawrence involved a divorce decree that required Donald Lawrence to pay the actual costs of his daughter's full-time college education until she reached twenty-two years of age or left college. 36 When
the court entered the decree, Alaska law permitted the award of postmajority educational support under Hinchey v. Hinchey.37 Three
lapsed. See International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 556 F.2d 665, 670 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978); Gila River Ranch, Inc. v. United States, 368 F.2d
354, 357 (9th Cir. 1966). The First Circuit has held that errors of law can never be
corrected with a Rule 60(b)(1) motion. See Elias v. Ford Motor Co., 734 F.2d 463,
467 (1st Cir. 1984). The Eleventh and Tenth Circuits permit trial courts to grant
60(b) motions after the time for appeal has expired when there has been a postjudgment change in law and a timely appeal from the original judgment has been filed. See
Morris v. Adams-Mills Corp., 758 F.2d 1352, 1358 (10th Cir. 1985); Parks v. U.S.
Life & Credit Corp., 677 F.2d 838, 840 (11th Cir. 1982).
33. See Willie v. Continental Oil Co., 746 F.2d 1041, 1046 (5th Cir. 1984). In
Willie, the court held that a district court may deny a 60(b) motion filed after a notice
of appeal because the action is in furtherance of an appeal. If the district court is
inclined to grant the 60(b) motion, however, it must obtain the leave of the court of
appeals. See also Venon v. Sweet, 758 F.2d 117, 123 (3d Cir. 1985) (accord).
34. In re Cresidas' Estate, 14 F.R.D. 15, 18 (D.C. Alaska 1953).
35. 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 5, § 2866, at 228-29 (footnotes
omitted).
36. Lawrence v. Lawrence, 718 P.2d 142, 144 (Alaska 1986). The support payments equalled $600 per month; the educational payments were capped at $7,200 per
year. Id.
37. Hinchey v. Hinchey, 625 P.2d 297 (Alaska 1981), overruled in part, Dowling
v. Dowling, 679 P.2d 480 (Alaska 1984).
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months later, the supreme court expressly overruled Hinchey in Dowling v. Dowling,3 s and held that the applicable Alaska statute only au39
thorized support for minor children.
Seven months after the entry of the divorce decree, and four
months after the Dowling decision, Lawrence filed a Civil Rule 60(b)
motion seeking to suspend those portions of the divorce decree that
ordered postmajority support.4° The superior court refused to grant
relief under either Civil Rule 60(b)(1) or (5).41 On appeal, the
supreme court ruled that relief from the prospective features of the
judgment, that is the future postmajority educational support payments, could be granted under Civil Rule 60(b)(5), 42 and remanded
the case to the superior court. The supreme court agreed with the
lower court holding that Civil Rule 60(b)(1) was unavailable as a basis
for relief because the time for appeal had expired when Lawrence filed
43
the motion.
In Lawrence, only Justices Moore and Burke indicated a willingness to distinguish between untimely Civil Rule 60(b)(1) motions fied
as substitutes for appeal and those filed late because no justification for
an appeal existed during the appeal period. Concurring with the result
but dissenting from the Civil Rule 60(b)(1) analysis, Justice Burke observed that until the announcement of the overruling decision:
a motion to amend the judgment, made upon the ground that the
trial court had no authority to order payment of post-majority educational support, was sure to fail. Under Hinchey, which the trial
court was bound to follow, the court would have no choice but to
deny the motion. Under these circumstances, I see no legitimate
reason to fault Lawrence's failure to bring his motion within the
time allowed for notice of appeal. Any such motion would have
been a useless act. 44
The majority refused to recognize the distinction identified by Justices
Moore and Burke and relied upon the reasoning in Parks v. US. Life
45
& Credit Corp.
Parks involved the use of certain terms in a loan disclosure statement issued by U.S. Life & Credit that allegedly confused and misled
38. Dowling, 679 P.2d 480. The Dowling decision was announced on March 30,
1984; the superior court granted the divorce decree in Lawrence on December 21,
1983.
39. Dowling, 679 P.2d at 483 (interpreting ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.160 (1984)).
40. Lawrence, 718 P.2d at 144.
41. Id. at 146.

42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Id. at 145-46.
Id. at 147 (Burke, J., dissenting).
Id. at 146 (citing Parks v. U.S. Life & Credit Corp., 677 F.2d 838 (11th Cir.

1982) (per curiam)).
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the borrower in violation of the Truth-in-Lending Act 46 and related
regulations. 47 The magistrate found that no violation had occurred. 4 8
Noting that no Supreme Court or court of appeals case in the same
circuit directly governed, the district judge disagreed with the magistrate and entered judgment for the Parks. 49 U.S. Life decided that it
would not appeal the case.50
Approximately eighteen months after the district court order in
Parks,the Fifth Circuit ruled in an unrelated case that terms identical
to those in Parks were not confusing or misleading.5 1 U.S. Life filed a
motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(1) and (6) three
months after that ruling.5 2 The district court denied U.S. Life's motion. The district court reasoned that although a change in controlling
law may warrant relief under Rule 60(b), no controlling law existed at
53
the time of the judgment.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court,5 4 but provided additional reasoning. The appellate court viewed as correct the district
court's finding that no controlling case law existed at the time of the
original judgment, 55 and implied that Rule 60(b)(1) encompasses
changes in controlling law.5 6 Nevertheless, the appellate court emphasized the fact that U.S. Life failed to file an appeal.5 7 With the view
that the Rule 60(b)(1) motion was an attempted substitute for an appeal after others had sought a ruling, the appellate court stated that
"[a]n unsuccessful litigant may not rely on appeals by others and share
in the fruits of victory by way of a 60(b) motion. . .. '[d]eliberate
choices [not to appeal] are not to be relieved from.' "58
46. Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (codified as amended in scattered sections of

15 U.S.C.).
47. 677 F.2d at 839.

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. (citing Blalock v. Aetna Fin. Co., 511 F. Supp. 33 (N.D. Ga. 1980), aff'd,
641 F.2d 878 (5th Cir. 1981)).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 841.
55. Id. at 839.
56. Id. at 839-40.
57. Id. at 840. The court stressed that the defendant chose not to appeal. Id.

58. Id. at 840-41 (quoting Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193 (1950) (cita-

tions omitted)). In Ackermann, the appellant chose not to file an appeal during the
period for filing appeals although an appeal was brought in a closely related case.
Indeed, the parties were relatives. But, as the court held, the appellant who failed to
file a timely notice of appeal could not "rely on others and share in the fruits of victory." This language does not apply to the procedural circumstances in Lawrence.

1987] RULE 60(b): POSTJUDGMENT CHANGES IN LAW

163

Lawrence is distinguishable from Parks in two ways. First, the
original decision in Parks was based upon ambiguous law. 59 The pertinent provisions of the divorce decree in Lawrence were based upon
authoritative and clear precedent.6 0 Second, in Parks, U.S. Life made
a conscious decision of litigation strategy in its decision not to appeal.
In Lawrence, filing an appeal was never a viable option. 61 These two
distinctions suggest that the party who forgoes an appeal in the face of
unclear precedent should not be relieved of the harsh results of his
decision. On the other hand, courts should not penalize a party for
failing to appeal from a judgment clearly supported by law.
Donald Lawrence did not seek to use a Civil Rule 60(b)(1) motion as a substitute for appeal, nor did he rely on the appeals of others.
Unfortunately, Lawrence failed to fie his motion within a reasonable
time. As Part V of this note discusses, an unjustifiable delay of four
months after a change in law to file a Civil Rule 60(b)(1) motion is
unreasonable.6 2 Courts are justified in refusing to entertain such an
untimely motion. Therefore, this note concurs with the result in
Lawrence.
There are two reasons the Lawrence decision is important to litigants who file Civil Rule 60(b)(1) motions. First, Lawrence supports
the proposition that the language of Civil Rule 60(b)(1) governs motions based on a change in the controlling law. Second, a litigant who
waits a substantial amount of time before filing a Civil Rule 60(b)(1)
motion will be denied relief. Arguably, the harsh result in Lawrence
need not occur in all cases in which the Rule 60(b)(1) motion is filed
after the expiration of the period for appeal. Lawrence is distinctive
because it involved a motion filed four months after the change in law.
The Alaska Supreme Court has yet to address a motion filed without
delay after a postjudgment change in law. Furthermore, while the
supreme court makes clear that Civil Rule 60(b)(1) motions are to be
filed within the thirty-day period allowed for appeals, the cases cited
by the court as precedent do not involve judicial "mistake" due to a
change in the law.6 3 What appears distinctively possible is that a future decision will distinguish Parks, lmit Lawrence to its facts, and
59. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. The Third Circuit appears to allow
correction of an erroneous decision in face of ambiguous precedent. See Sleek v. J.C.
Penny Co., 292 F.2d 256 (3d Cir. 1961).
60. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
61. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the use of a
Rule 60(b)(6) motion in a "no choice" situation, see infra note 95.
62. See infra notes 97-105 and accompanying text.
63. See supra note 14.
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reach a different result. In light of the above, the denial of a promptly
fied Civil Rule 60(b)(1) motion would be worthy of appeal.64
IV.

THE FUTURE APPLICABILITY OF RULE

60(b)

If the Alaska Supreme Court were to reconsider the Lawrence
decision, due consideration likely would be given to the applicability
of clauses (5) and (6) of Civil Rule 60(b) to motions based upon postjudgment changes in law. Rather than overrule the well-established
principle that litigants must file Civil Rule 60(b)(1) motions within the
period of appeal, 65 application of an alternative clause might seem to
offer the court an easier solution.6 6 As a matter of law, however,
neither clause (5) nor (6) can provide uniform relief in cases of subsequent changes in the law. Furthermore, as a matter of policy, the expanded application of these clauses could create more problems than it
would resolve.
Motions made under clauses (1)-(3) of Rule 60(b) are restricted
by a "reasonable time" limit, not to exceed one year.6 7 Motions under
clauses (4)-(6) are subject only to a "reasonable time" requirement.6 8
A Civil Rule 60(b)(5) or (6) motion, therefore, can be considered at
any time, even years after the final judgment.6 9 Without an outer time
limit, the allowance of 60(b)(5) or (6) motions solely based upon
change in the controlling law would undermine the finality of judgments. To avoid making the enforceability of final judgments dependent upon the stability of the law, 70 courts have narrowly interpreted
and strictly applied Rule 60(b)(5) and (6).
64. For the argument that a motion is timely if filed within 30 days of the change
in law, see infra notes 97-105 and accompanying text.
65. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
66. Clauses (2), (3), and (4) are inapplicable on their face and therefore not viable
alternatives.
67. Civil Rule 60(b).
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, modified, 336 U.S. 942
(1949) (finding four years reasonable); Tsakonites v. Transpacific Carriers Corp., 322
F. Supp. 722 (S.D. N.Y. 1970) (finding five years reasonable); Pierre v. Bernuth,
Lembeke Co., 20 F.R.D. 116 (S.D. N.Y. 1956) (finding three years reasonable); In re
Cremidas' Estate, 14 F.R.D. 15 (D. Alaska 1953) (finding three years reasonable).
But see Ashford v. Steuart, 657 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding 30 days unreasonable where movant offered no explanation for his failure to timely challenge ruling in
question by direct appeal or 60(b) motion); Delzona Corp. v. Sacks, 265 F.2d 157 (3d
Cir. 1959) (finding one and one-half years unreasonable); Morgan v. Southern Farm
Bureau Casualty Ins. Corp., 42 F.R.D. 25 (W.D. La. 1967) (finding 23 months perse
unreasonable).
70. See Parks v. U.S. Life & Credit Corp., 677 F.2d 838, 841 (1Ith Cir. 1982) (per
curiam).
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A. Rule 60(b)(5): Relief from the Prospective Aspects
of Final Judgments
Following the lead of several federal courts, 71 the Alaska
Supreme Court in Lawrence held that "relief under Civil Rule 60(b)(5)
may be granted from [the] prospective features [of a judgment] when
subsequent events make it no longer equitable that the judgment have
prospective application. ' 72 Courts have traditionally limited relief
from the prospective application of a judgment to injunctions. 73 Today, however, courts have little difficulty in extending the coverage of
Rule 60(b)(5) to any final judgments having prospective application. 74
On an adequate showing, courts will provide relief if it is no longer
equitable that the judgment be enforced, whether because of subsequent legislation, 75 a change in the operative facts, 76 or a change in the
controlling decisional law. 77 By its own terms, relief under the "prospective application" clause of Rule 60(b)(5) is limited to judgments
with prospective effect. 78 Consequently, Rule 60(b)(5) fails to provide
a rule that can be applied uniformly to all judgments affected by postdecisional changes in law.
Another ground for relief under Civil Rule 60(b)(5), that a prior
judgment upon which the present judgment is based has been revised
or otherwise vacated, appears more promising as a means to provide a
general rule applicable to all cases of postjudgment decisional
changes. 79 In practice, however, courts have infrequently applied and
narrowly interpreted this ground. Courts require the moving party to
prove that the judgment was "directly related, by parties and claims,"
71. Jordan v. School Dist. of Erie, 548 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1977); Theriault v.

Smith, 523 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1975). The United States Supreme Court has affirmed
the granting of relief from a continuing judgment due to change in law. See Systems
Fed'n No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 647 (1961); United States v. Swift & Co., 286
U.S. 106 (1932).
72. Lawrence v. Lawrence, 718 P.2d 142, 146 (Alaska 1986).
73. 7 J.MOORE, supra note 1, 60.26[4], at 60-251 to 60-261.
74. See, e.g., United States v. Edell, 15 F.R.D. 382 (S.D. N.Y. 1954); accord 7 J.
MOORE, supra note 1, 60.26[4], at 60-262; 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note
5, § 2863, at 205; see also Bros, Inc. v. W.E. Grace Mfg. Co., 320 F.2d 594 (5th Cir.
1963) (judgment yet to be paid).
75. See, e.g., Systems Fed'n No. 91, 364 U.S. 642.

76. See, e.g., Tobin v. Alma Mills, 192 F.2d 133 (4th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 933 (1952).
77. See, e.g., Elgin Nat'l Watch Co. v. Barrett, 213 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1954);

Coca-Cola Co. v. Standard Bottling Co., 138 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1943).
78. See, e.g., Bros, Inc. v. W.E. Grace Mfg. Co., 320 F.2d 594, 610 (5th Cir. 1963)
("[WMe are dealing with the prospective application of the judgment, not the unscrambling of the past.").
79. The third ground for relief under Civil Rule 60(b)(5), that the "judgment has
been satisfied, released, or discharged," is inapplicable on its face.
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It is not sufficient that

the prior decision provided only precedent for the challenged
judgment."'
B.

Rule 60(b)(6): Relief in "Extraordinary Circumstances"

Like Civil Rule 60(b)(5), the scope of Civil Rule 60(b)(6) precludes the clause from uniform application in cases involving postjudgment changes in law. Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) cannot be
granted on a ground covered by any of the first five clauses of Rule
60(b). In Klapprott v. United States,8 2 the first United States Supreme
Court case to construe Rule 60(b)(6), Justice Black stated that "the
language of the 'other reason' clause, for all reasons except the five
particularly specified, vests power in courts adequate to enable them to

vacate judgments whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish
justice. 8s 3 Though not always a conscientious adherent to the mutual
exclusivity principle articulated in Klapprott,s4 the Alaska Supreme
Court recently acknowledged that relief under clause (6) is unavailable
unless the other clauses are inapplicable.8 5 Having held that Civil
Rule 60(b)(1) governs motions based upon changes in controlling

law, 8 6 the supreme court is bound by the mutual exclusivity principle
87
to refuse consideration of such motions under Civil Rule 60(b)(6).

80. See, e.g., Michigan Sur. Co. v. Service Mach. Corp., 277 F.2d 531 (5th Cir.
1960); see also Note, supra note 23, at 653.
81. Lubben v. Selective Serv. Local Bd.No. 27, 453 F.2d 645, 650 (1st Cir. 1972);
see Title v. United States, 263 F.2d 28 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 989 (1959);
Berryhill v. United States, 199 F.2d 217, 219 (6th Cir. 1952); Loucke v. United States,
21 F.R.D. 305 (S.D. N.Y. 1957); 7 J. MOORE, supra note I, %60.26[4], at 60-248; 11
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 5, § 2863, at 203-04. For the argument that
Rule 60(b)(5) has been narrowly applied without reason and that relief due to a judicial change in the law should be governed by Rule 60(b)(5), see Note, supra note 23, at
663-66.
82. 335 U.S. 601, modified, 336 U.S. 942 (1949).
83. Id. at 614-15 (emphasis added).
84. See, eg., Patrick v. Sedwick, 413 P.2d 169 (Alaska 1966) (relief under Civil
Rule 60(b)(2) or 60(b)(6)). But see Farell v. Dome Laboratories, 650 P.2d 380 (Alaska
1982) (appellant failed to present evidence that case involved something more than
one of the goals stated in first five clauses of the rule).
85. Stone v. Stone, 647 P.2d 582 (Alaska 1982); O'Link v. O'Link, 632 P.2d 225
(Alaska 1981).
86. Lawrence v. Lawrence, 718 P.2d 142 (Alaska 1986).
87. See Stone, 647 P.2d at 586 (relief available under Civil Rule 60(b)(6) is exclusive of other remedies available under Civil Rule 60(b)(1)-(5)).
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Courts have further restricted Civil Rule 60(b)(6) motions by
holding that only "extraordinary circumstances" warrant relief.88 In

Livingston v. Livingston,8 9 for example, the Alaska Supreme Court relied upon Civil Rule 60(b)(6) to affirm a superior court judgment vacating the custody provisions of a divorce decree. The superior court
had opened and vacated the default judgment upon discovery that the
child's mother and her counsel failed to inform the court, at the time
of the divorce proceedings, that the child was not physically present in
Alaska. 90 The supreme court found that clause (6) applied under the
unusual circumstances of that case. 91
The Alaska Supreme Court is unlikely to find that a postjudgment change in law, by itself, constitutes a sufficiently unusual or extraordinary circumstance to invoke clause (6). With one rather
extraordinary exception, 92 abundant authority exists for refusing relief
88. Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 197-202 (1950); Goland v. CIA,
607 F.2d 339, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cerL denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980); O'Link, 632
P.2d at 229-30.
The United States Supreme Court has not directly addressed the applicability of
Rule 60(b)(6) to a request for relief from judgment based on a change in the law.
There are three cases in which the rule has been applied. See Polites v. United States,
364 U.S. 426 (1960); Ackermann, 340 U.S. 193; Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S.
601, modified, 336 U.S. 942 (1949). The decisions in Klapprottand Ackerman establish that relief from final judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) requires a showing of "extraordinary circumstances."
In Klapprott, a denaturalization default judgment was entered against the petitioner while he was both seriously ill and wrongfully imprisoned. Because of these
unusual circumstances, the Court affirmed the granting of relief on a motion filed four
years after the judgment based upon a change in law.
In Ackermann, the Court did not find the requisite extraordinary circumstances
sufficient to warrant relief under Rule 60(b)(6) based upon a change in law when
petitioner made a free, calculated, and deliberate choice not to appeal.
Polites,which affirmed denial of a Rule 60(b) motion based upon a change in law
because the controlling law had not in fact changed, is notable because it left open the
question whether "when an appeal has been abandoned or not taken because of a
clearly applicable adverse rule of law, relief under Rule 60(b) is inflexibly to be withheld when there has been a clear and authoritative change in governing law." Polites,
364 U.S. at 433.
89. Livingston, 572 P.2d 79.
90. Id. at 81.
91. Id. at 85-86. The supreme court first described the facts of Livingston as "unusual" in O'Link, 632 P.2d at 230.
92. Pierce v. Cook & Co., 518 F.2d 720 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1079 (1976) (granting relief under Rule 60(b)(6) where in two suits stemming from
same accident, plaintiffs who removed to federal court lost summary judgment motion
due to state precedent, while plaintiff who remained in state court system prevailed
upon appeal to the state's highest court which overruled the precedent). For criticism
of Pierce,see Note, Pierce v. Cook & Co.: Change in State Law asa Groundfor Relief
from a FederalJudgment, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 843 (1976).
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for postjudgment changes in law under Rule 60(b)(6). 93 Although the

supreme court advocates the liberal construction of Civil Rule 60(b)(6)
in order to permit lower courts to vacate judgments in the interest of
justice,9 4 case law demonstrates the need to show additional facts to
justify a finding of extraordinary circumstances. 95
Neither Alaska Civil Rule 60(b)(5) nor (6) can govern adequately
motions based upon postjudgment changes in law. Unrestricted by the
one-year time limitation of clauses (1)-(3), motions may be made

under clauses (5)-(6) within any "reasonable time." The uncertainty
that surrounds the "reasonable time" concept, and the degree to which

a judge may invoke his discretion, would undermine finality more than
it would correct injustice. Courts have limited relief under Rule
60(b)(5) to prospective judgments and to decisions in which a related
proceeding was subsequently overruled. If Civil Rule 60(b)(6) applies,
the movant must show extraordinary circumstances in addition to the
change in decisional law. Even then, the concept of mutual exclusivity
would probably prohibit the consideration of a Civil Rule 60(b)(6) motion in Alaska because Alaska courts have declared that Civil Rule
60(b)(1) governs motions based upon changes in law. 96 Consequently,

Civil Rule 60(b)(1) should continue to control these motions.
V.

A PROPOSAL FOR THE GRANTING OF 60(b)(1) MOTIONS FILED
WITHIN THIRTY DAYS AFTER A CHANGE IN LAW

In Alaska, motions based on a subsequent change in the law are
governed by Civil Rule 60(b)(1) and must be made within the thirty
93. See, e.g., Lubben v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 27, 453 F.2d 645 (1st
Cir. 1972); Title v. United States, 263 F.2d 28, 31 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 789
(1959); Berryhill v. United States, 199 F.2d 217, 219 (6th Cir. 1952).
94. O'Link v. O'Link, 632 P.2d 225, 230 (Alaska 1981); Alaska Truck Transp. v.
Berman Packing Co., 469 P.2d 697, 699 (Alaska 1970).
95. The Supreme Court decisions in Polites v. United States, 364 U.S. 426 (1960),
Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193 (1950), and Klapprott v. United States, 335
U.S. 601, modified, 336 U.S. 942 (1949), together suggest that in circumstances that
leave the movant with no choice but not to appeal the judgment, Rule 60(b) relief may
be available. As observed supra note 88, the Polites decision suggests that failure to
appeal in the face of clear and authoritative precedent might be a "no choice" situation. Polites makes no recommendation as to which clauses of Rule 60(b) would be
applicable in this case. Rule 60(b)(6) seems inappropriate for the only extraordinary
circumstance present is the postjudgment change in law. See supra text accompanying
notes 92-95. For reasons discussed in the text accompanying notes 8-14, supra, Civil
Rule 60(b)(1) should be the governing rule in Alaska.
96. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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days allowed for an appeal. 97 This time restriction is artificially imposed and not specifically prescribed by the rule. 98 The primary reasons for limiting to thirty days the time to file a motion - ensuring
the finality of judgment 99 and preventing the use of 60(b) motions as
substitutes for appeals10 0 - are sensible in the context of appealable
errors, but senseless in the event of postjudgment changes in the law
occurring after the appeal period has run.
A Civil Rule 60(b)(1) motion made soon after the change in law
passes the two-prong test for reasonableness articulated by Professors
Wright and Miller. 0 1 The movant has good reasons for not taking
appropriate action sooner - until the change in controlling law is announced, no realistic basis for a 60(b) motion exists. 0 2 Moreover, a
delay in seeking relief generally will not prejudice the nonmovant.
Any harm caused to the nonmovant is more likely due to the fact that
the original judgment would be set aside than it is due to delay. 10 3 In
light of the fact that a Rule 60(b)(1) motion filed within one year from
judgment and immediately after a change in law will generally pass the
Wright and Miller test for reasonableness regardless of whether the
period for appeal has expired, Alaska should decide such motions on a
case-by-case basis.
Lawrence's delay in filing the Civil Rule 60(b) motion failed the
two-prong test for reasonableness. There is no indication that Lawrence offered any reason for his failure to file the motion sooner. Finding a failure to pass one prong of the test, the court need not consider
whether the nonmovant has been prejudiced by the delay. Application
of the reasonableness test to Lawrence supports the superior court's
denial of the Civil Rule 60(b) motion.
Greater uniformity may be achieved by equating a reasonable
time after a change in law with a fixed period. An obvious choice for
the fixed number of days is thirty, the time allowed for filing an appeal.
Apparently, thirty days offers sufficient time to prepare the appropriate motions. Unlike an appeal, which presupposes that a party has
available all information necessary for making an informed decision, a
change in law may not become immediately evident. A five-to-ten day
grace period to allow for the dissemination of information, therefore,
97. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
98. Civil Rule 60(b) provides only that "[t]he motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and... not more than one year after the judgment."
99. See supra note 23.
100. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
102. See Lairsey v. Advance Abrasives Co., 542 F.2d 928, 932 (5th Cir. 1976);
Lawrence v. Lawrence, 718 P.2d 142, 147 (Alaska 1986) (Burke, J., dissenting).
103. E.g., Smith v. Widman Trucking & Excavating, 627 F.2d 792, 798 (7th Cir.

1980).
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should be added to the thirty-day period. 1 0 4 Nevertheless, a thirty-day
limit would ensure that ,the parties closely monitor the
law to safe10 5
guard their rights during the one-year motion period.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Alaska courts should not inflexibly apply the "period of appeal" time requirement to Civil Rule 60(b)(1) motions based on
postjudgment changes in law. Finding that such motions are timely
will not encourage their use as a substitute for appeal. Prior to the
06
change in law the movant never really has the option to appeal.'
Granting these motions would correct judicial mistakes and serve the
interests of justice without significantly sacrificing finality.
Gary Edward Mason

104. The enormous size of the Alaska court system's jurisdiction and less than
adequate communication supports an argument for an extended motion period.
105. If an attorney failed to file a motion within the postchange time period and
the client learned of the mistake, could the client file a Civil Rule 60(b) motion based
upon the attorney's mistake? The answer must be "no," for the mistake arose from
the motion and not from the initial judgment. The client's remedy is a legal malpractice suit.
106. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.

